A euro referendum
Greece’s woes
The markets are not the euro’s only threat. Voters may be too
Nov 5th 2011 | from the print edition
EVEN by the euro zone’s undemanding standards, a summit deal that survived less than a week is lamentable. Early on October 27th Angela Merkel, the German chancellor, and Nicolas Sarkozy, the French president, hailed a “comprehensive package” to save the euro. Yet by the time The Economist went to press, their plans were in tatters. Greece’s prime minister, George Papandreou, looked doomed, rejected by some of his ministers, many in his party—and, possibly, most of his country.
The shallowness of the summit’s achievements has been brutally exposed. Instead of settling into a period of calm, markets were thrown into new turmoil (see article). One way or another, the euro is destined for an unavoidable test of popular support. Unless the euro zone’s leaders shape up, this is an encounter their currency may well lose.
Heed the messenger
Mr Papandreou was in part the author of his own misfortune. Seeking the backing of the Greek people in a referendum, he was immediately condemned in the capitals of Europe as a fool or a traitor. Why had he wrecked all their good work? How dare he bring disaster on the rest of the euro zone when it had so generously bailed out his scapegrace of a country? A furious Mr Sarkozy and Mrs Merkel summoned him for a dressing-down on the fringes of the G20 summit in Cannes. Mr Sarkozy’s hopes that this gathering might set the stage for generous emerging-market investment to support the euro were already faint. They now look impossible.
There is no disputing that Mr Papandreou, in spectacularly chaotic style, has left the euro zone racked by uncertainty. His referendum now seems unlikely to take place. Perhaps Pasok, his party, will enter a government of national unity with New Democracy, the opposition, headed by a technocrat. Perhaps there will be an election. Perhaps even these plans will fall apart, just as the last did (see article). All the while, the clock is ticking: within a month or so, Greece must receive fresh funds from the IMF and its European rescuers—or messily default.
Mr Papandreou has created an almighty mess, but he is better cast as the messenger than the villain. He was not to blame for the summit’s shortcomings. The spreads between Italian and German government debt had begun to widen well before Mr Papandreou dropped his bombshell. If the euro zone had put a credible firewall around the government bonds of Italy and other troubled euro countries, a Greek default would not now be threatening contagion. Stable sovereign borrowers would have helped to safeguard Europe’s banks, and a decent plan to strengthen the weakest banks would have secured the door. But last week’s summit deal—concocting a jerry-built firewall and asking the banks to boost their capital ratios by June next year—was not up to scratch. No wonder the markets took fright only days later.
At one level, Mr Papandreou does not deserve blame even for seeking a mandate on the summit’s main achievement (though he must now be ruing his decision). Although the proposal to write down the face value of privately held Greek-government debt by 50% would be substantial and welcome, Greece’s stock of debt would, even on best assumptions, still add up to 120% of GDP by 2020. All the while, the Greek people would be living with austerity.
Hence Mr Papandreou’s most important message. Until now the euro crisis has chiefly been about pressure from the markets. But a country’s finances are not defined by markets alone. Rather the limits of solvency are tested by people’s willingness to accept tax rises and spending cuts. A government runs out of political capital long before it runs out of things to tax. In the end, won’t pay matters more than can’t pay.
Greece is farther down this road than any other member of the euro zone—even though other countries such as Portugal and Ireland have already seen their governments toppled and Spain is about to follow suit. Beset by rebels in his own party, by a hostile media and by strikes and protests, Mr Papandreou concluded that he would find it hard to impose the austerity being asked of Greece. Every quarter the EU, the IMF and the European Central Bank (ECB) scrutinise Greece before releasing the next chunk of money. With nowhere to hide, he decided to appeal over the heads of his opponents to the people.
Greece’s next government, whatever its composition, cannot escape the growing resentment of the country’s political class. A growing but still small contingent of Greeks wants to defy the EU’s treaties and quit the euro altogether. Fully 60% reject the summit deal. But Greek withdrawal still looks like a terrible mistake. Depositors would rush to pull their money out of Greek banks to protect their savings from being converted into new drachma. Greek firms would be bankrupted by their euro debts. The gain in competitiveness from devaluation would be transient if, as is likely, wages inflated along with prices. Even Greece’s EU membership would be in doubt.
What to do?
Greece’s government must wisely spend what scant political capital it may have. Above all, the economy needs to grow. Despite their anger, 70% of Greeks say they want to remain in the euro, but their tolerance for austerity has limits. The government must devote less effort to growth-destroying tax rises and instead undertake growth-promoting structural reforms. It will have to begin facing down public-sector unions and enforcing barely implemented reforms. Mr Papandreou’s government consistently took the easy way out.
The euro zone’s emphasis on austerity rather than structural reforms has aggravated Greece’s political woes. Instead it should favour medium-term fiscal consolidation. The creditor nations could boost domestic demand, to provide a bigger market for debtors’ exports. Most of all, they should dispel the threat of contagion by putting the ECB’s balance-sheet behind the debt of solvent governments, like Italy and Spain. Throughout this crisis, creditors—particularly Germany—have worried about being too soft on the euro zone’s weaklings, for fear that they would go slow on reform. Mr Papandreou has shown that they also need to worry about being too austere.
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